IEEE P802.11
Wireless LANs

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| 11bi D2.0 CR for CIDs related to PGTK |
| Date: 2025-10-15 |
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Abstract

This submission proposes resolutions for the following CIDs:

2334, 2348, 2487, 2490, 2491

Revisions:

* Rev 0. Initial version of the document.
* Rev 1. Rejection of CIDs 2490 and 2348

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| **CID** | **Clause** | **Comment** | **Proposed Change** | **Resolution** |
| 2334 | 12.2.4 | What does it mean to "program a key"? The baseline terminology is to "install a key" | Make the following changes:At 129.48, 129.50, 129.58, 129.60, 130.2, and 130.4" change "programs" to "installs"At 129.52 and 129.61, change "programmed into" to "installed in" | ACCEPTED |
| 2487 | 3.2 | PGTK definition says that it is used for frame anonymization, but does not specify which type of FA , for CPE of BPE."[PGTK] A random value, assigned by an access point (AP) multilink device (MLD), shared to all non-access point (non-AP) multi-link devices (MLDs) associated to the APMLD for frame anonymization."In 10.71, PGTK is only used for BPE\_MHA\_block and not used for CPE\_MHA\_block. |  Clarify in PGTK definition whether it is used for both CPE and BPE FA. | REJECTEDThe term frame anonymization is used in the standard to encompass both CPE frame anonymization and BPE frame anonymization and the PGTK is used for both.  |
| 2491 | 6.5.14.1.4 | "In the text ""When the Key Type parameteris PGTK, the MAC installs the key, and the FA is processed using that key"", what does it mean by processing FA with PGTK? Does it mean CPE\_MHA\_block or BPE\_MHA\_block generated using PGTK? Could the text be more specific in how PGTK is used for FA, perhaps by adding a NOTE." | As in comment | REJECTEDNo change in order to stay aligned with the definition of the PGTK and the other parts of the standard which indicates only that the PGTK is used for FA in order to encompass its use both in the EPP Epoch Start Time Computation and the BPE parameters computation. |
| 2490 | 12.7.2 | it may provide more flexibility to define PGTK as variable size instead of fixed 32 octets. Since PGTK KDE is encapsulated in a KDE (FIG 12-38 in REVmf) there is Length field that would indicate size of PGTK. This would be similar to GTK or IGTK both of which have variable size. | Change PGTK size from 32 octets to variable. | REJECTEDA variable length could lead to a bad configuration. Moreover, the PGTK is not aligned with AKMs in which several key lengths could be specified.  |
| 2348 | 10.71.4 | PGTK is used for two privacy purposes (EPP Epoch Start Time Computation and Establishing BPE MAC header anonymization parameter sets) which constitutes a bad key hygiene / key separation in terms of security. | Please define two different keys derived from PGTK, one for the EPP Epoch Start Time Computation and one for Establishing BPE MAC header anonymization parameter sets | REJECTEDThe security issue is not identified and the use of two keys makes more complex the management of Start Time Computation and BPE MAC header anonymization parameter sets which are two decorrelated features. |

* **Security**
* **Framework**
* **RSNA establishment**

***Change the first bullet, the second bullet, the fifth bullet, and add a new bullet of the first paragraph as follows (not all lines are shown):***

An SME establishes an RSNA in one of seven ways:

* If an RSNA uses authentication negotiated over IEEE Std 802.1X or FILS authentication in an infrastructure BSS, an SME establishes an RSNA as follows:
* It identifies the AP as an RSNA AP from the AP’s Beacon, Privacy Beacon, DMG Beacon, Announce, Information Response, FILS Discovery, or Probe Response frames.

NOTE—As described in 10.71.8.4 (Steering to BPE AP MLD), the STA might identify an AP affiliated with a BPE AP MLD by using the AP's anonymized link address and the Neighbor Report element that is received from the associated AP.

* It shall invoke Open System, IEEE 802.1X authentication, or FILS authentication if the STA is a non-DMG STA.
* It negotiates cipher suites during the association process, as described in 12.6.2 (RSNA selection) and 12.6.3 (RSNA policy selection in an infrastructure BSS).
* It uses IEEE Std 802.1X-2020 to authenticate if IEEE 802.1X authentication is not performed before association, as described in 12.6.8 (RSNA establishment in an infrastructure BSS) and 12.6.9 (RSNA authentication in an IBSS), FT protocol to authenticate as described in 13.5 (FT protocol) or uses FILS authentication to authenticate as described in 12.11 (Authentication for FILS).
* If EPP epoch operation is supported by both the AP MLD and the non-AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334) the PGTK into the MAC for frame anonymization.
* If the AP is affiliated with a BPE AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334) the identity key if the key is not already installed in(#2334) the MAC to identify the AP MLDs with that configured identity key from its Privacy Beacon frames.
* If an RSNA is based on a PSK or password in an infrastructure BSS, an SME establishes an RSNA as follows:
* If EPP epoch operation is supported by both the AP MLD and the non-AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334) the PGTK into the MAC for frame anonymization.
* If the AP is affiliated with a BPE AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334)the identity key if the key is not already installed in(#2334) the MAC for identifying the AP MLDs with that configured identity key from its Privacy Beacon frames.
* If an RSNA allows for confidentiality only (no authentication) in an infrastructure BSS, an SME establishes an RSNA as follows:
* If EPP epoch operation is supported by both the AP MLD and the non-AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334) the PGTK into the MAC for frame anonymization.
* If the AP is affiliated with a BPE AP MLD, the SME installs(#2334) the identity key into the MAC for identifying the AP MLD from its Privacy Beacon frames.
* If an RSNA uses PASN authentication, an RSNA capable the STA establishes an RSNA as described in 12.13 (Preassociation security negotiation(11az)).
* If an RSNA uses EPPKE authentication, an RSNA capable STA establishes an RSNA as described in 12.16.9 (Enhanced Privacy Protection Key Exchange).