IEEE P802.11  
Wireless LANs

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| TGbe SA1 EAPoL-Key Notation Clean-up | | | | |
| Date: 2024-02-16 | | | | |
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Background

This contribution deals with updating EAPoL-Key notation. This addresses CIDs 22102

R0: Initial versoin

### Discussion:

The EAPOL-key notation was updated in REVme D5.0 and this contribution addresses CID 22102 to update the text added by P802.11be.

Notation:

* The Key Data field value is denoted by {…}
* Optional key data elements are denoted by […, ]

### Proposed Resolution:

REVISED. Update the EAPoL-key notation for Key Data to make it less cumbersome and more extensible in <this>

NOTE to editor. This updated text pulls in specification text from REVme D5.0

***Update the following text in this clause as follows:***

* 4-way handshake
* General

***Update the following text at the beginning of the clause:***

RSNA defines a protocol using (#1836)EAPOL-Key PDUs called the *4-way handshake*. The handshake completes the IEEE 802.1X authentication process. The information flow of the 4-way handshake is as follows:

Message 1: Authenticator ® Supplicant: EAPOL-Key((#3596)0 or 1,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0, {PMKID})(#6590)

Message 2: Supplicant ® Authenticator: EAPOL-Key((#3596)0 or 1,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC, {RSNE [, RSNXE] [, OCI] [, MAC Address, MLO Linkn])(#6590)

Message 3: Authenticator®Supplicant:   
EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,1,P,0,(#1406)RSC,ANonce,MIC,{RSNE [, RSNXE] [, OCI] [, GTK(N)] [, IGTK(M, IPN)] [, BIGTK(Q, BIPN)] [, WIGTK(R, WIPN)] [, MAC Address, MLO Linkm, MLO GTKm] [, MLO IGTKn] [, MLO BIGTKn]}

Message 4: Supplicant ® Authenticator: EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,P,0,0,0,MIC,{[MAC Address]}).

The receiver of an EAPOL-Key message shall accept elements and KDEs in the Key Data field in any order.

* Group key handshake
* General

The Authenticator may initiate the exchange at any time when a Supplicant is disassociated or deauthenticated.

Message 1: Authenticator ® Supplicant:

EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,(#1406)RSC,0, MIC, {[GTK(N)] [, OCI} [, IGTK(M, IPN)] [, BIGTK(Q, BIPN)] [(11ba), WIGTK(R, WIPN)] [, MLO GTKn] [, MLO IGTKn] [, MLO BIGTKn]})(#6590)

Message 2: Supplicant ® Authenticator: EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,0,MIC,{ [OCI]})(#6590)

(#6590)NOTE 1—Elements and KDEs in the key data field can be included in any order.

* FT initial mobility domain association
* Overview

The FT initial mobility domain association is the first (re)association in the mobility domain, where the SME of the STA enables its future use of the FT procedures.

FT initial mobility domain association is typically the first association within the ESS. In addition to Association Request and Response frames, Reassociation Request and Response frames are supported in the initial mobility domain association to enable both FT and non-FT APs to be present in a single ESS.

* FT initial mobility domain association in an RSN

***Update the following text at the beginning of this clause as follows:***

Between a non-AP MLD and an AP MLD, the FT 4-way handshake is as follows:

R1KH→S1KH: EAPOL-Key(0, 0, 1, 0, P, 0, 0, ANonce, 0, {MAC Address})

S1KH→R1KH: EAPOL-Key(0, 1, 0, 0, P, 0, 0, SNonce, MIC, {RSNE(PMKR1Name), MDE, FTE [, RSNXE] [, OCI] [, MAC Address, MLO Linkn]})

R1KH→S1KH: EAPOL-Key(1, 1, 1, 1, P, 0, 0, ANonce, MIC, {RSNE(PMKR1Name), MDE, FTE, TIE(ReassociationDeadline), TIE(KeyLifetime) [, OCI], [, WIGTK(R, WIPN)] [, MAC Address, MLO Linkm, MLO GTKn] [, MLO IGTKn] [, MLO BIGTKn, })

S1KH→R1KH: EAPOL-Key(1, 1, 0, 0, P, 0, 0, 0, MIC, {MAC Address})

(#6590)NOTE—Elements and KDEs in the key data field can be included in any order.

The message sequence is described in 12.7.6 (4-way handshake).