IEEE P802.11
Wireless LANs

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| 802.11[Resolutions to a few LB240 comments(relative to IEEE 802.11 REVmd D2.0 and P802.11az D1.0) |
| Date: 2019-04-18 |
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**Abstract**

This submission proposes resolutions to the following LB240 CIDs 1026, 1099, 1235, 1883, 1923, 2223, 2235, 2253, 2335, 2339, 2451 and 1593.

History:

R0: Initial Version

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| 1026 | Albert Petrick | 11.3.3 | 78.05 | Fix "TBD" in management frame - Disassociation and sentence structure | As commented | REVISE |
| 1099 | Alfred Asterjadhi | 11.3.3 | 86.04 | TBD. | Fix the TBD | REVISE |
| 1235 | Assaf Kasher | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | TBD in text - should be removed | replace "TBD (subset or all)" with "All" | REVISE |
| 1883 | Kazuyuki Sakoda | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | There is a TBD in 11.3.3 | Please resolve this tbd |  |
| 1923 | Mark RISON | 11.3.3 | 86.04 | A document with a "TBD" is not suitable for letter ballot | As it says in the comment |  |
| 2223 | Michael Montemurro | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | "TBD (Subset or all)". It sounds like more work is required here. Also, aren't all frames (regardless of security assocation) considered Class 2 frames? | Replace TBD with a description of the Claass 2 frame. |  |
| 2235 | Minyoung Park | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | There is a TBD in the draft. | Please resolve the TBD. |  |
| 2253 | Nehru Bhandaru | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | Text adopted from 19/163r3 related to TBD resolution of frame filtering related to pre-association missing. It should read "Unicast Protected Dual of Public Action frames (9.6.10) when PTKSA from PASN authentication exists" | Replace with text from document - see comment. | Accept |
| 2335 | Stephen McCann | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | The "TBD" needs to be clarified. | Change "TBD" to "All" |  |
| 2339 | Thomas Handte | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | There is a TBD | Please define the TBD |  |
| 2451 | Tomoko Adachi | 11.3.3 | 78.04 | Determine the TBD part. | As in comment. |  |

Discussion:

Option-A:

Submission 19/163r3 proposes the following:

(iv) Unicast Protected Dual of Public Action frames (9.6.10) when PTKSA from PASN authentication exists

Option-B:

Alternatively, an explicit enumeration of all PTKSA derived from PASN protected frames will resolve these comments as well.

enumerate all unicast robust management frames that .11az envisions to be protected by PTKSA derivred from PASN. The list currently includes, initial Fine Timing Measurement Request, initial Fine Timing Measurement and Location Measurement Reports. Note that the initial Fine Timing Measurement Request and initial Fine Timing Measurment frames as defined in IEEE802.11-2016 are not subject to this protection – these frames are subject to this protection if and only if they include (a) Ranging Parameters element or (b) Fine Timing Measurement Parameters element where Secure ToF Measurement is enabled.

Resolution: Accept with Option-A or Revise with Option-B

Option-A

***TGaz Editor: Incorporate editor instructions for Clause 11.3.3 from submission 19/163r3***

*Option-B*

***TGaz Editor: ensure that item (iv) in P78L4 is aligned with other items in the list; and modify it as shown below:***

iv) Unicast Robust Management frames listed below when PTKSA from PASN authentication exists:

* initial Fine Timing Measurement Request frame that includes a Ranging Parameters element or a Fine Timing Measurement Parameters element where the Secure ToF Measurement subfield of the Fine Timing Measurement Parameters field is set to 1,
* initial Fine Timing Measurement frame that includes a Ranging Parameters element or a Fine Timing Measurement Parameters element where the Secure ToF Measurement subfield of the Fine Timing Measurement Parameters field is set to 1,
* Location Measurement Report Frame

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| 1589 | Ganesh Venkatesan | 4.3.19.19 | 6 |  | "With the regular transfer of Fine Timing Measurement frames it is possible for the recipient STA to track changes in its relative location with other STAs in the environment." Not true if the measurement exchange is non-Trigger based or Trigger based | The statement in the baseline needs to be modified to include exchanges corresponding to nTB abd TB as means for estimating position/location. Replace with "With the regular transfer of Fine Timing Measurement frames or with regular execution of ranging sounding exchanges, it is possible for the recipient STA to track changes in its relative location with other STAs in the environment." | REVISE |  |

Discussion: The comment identifies a valid omission. However, the use of ‘ranging sounding’ is odd and needs better wording. Recommend using ‘range measurement exchanges’ instead of ‘ranging sounding exchanges’.

Alternatively, the following could be used:

With the regular execution of range measurement exchanges, it is possible for the recipient STA to track changes in its relative location with other STAs in the environment.

Proposed Resolution: REVISE

 Replace statement at P6L18-19 as follows:

With the regular transfer of Fine Timing Measurement frames or with regular execution of range measurement exchanges,it is possible for the recipient STA to track changes in its relative location with other STAs in the environment.

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| 1593 | Ganesh Venkatesan | 6.3.5.3.3 | 10 |  | The description corresponding to Contents of the PASN Authentication Frame is incorrect. Note that .confirm is generated by the MAC layer and sent to the SME. So, the contents of the .confirm primitive are derived from a Authentication frame received from the peer. So, 'the set of elements and fields to be included in PASN authentication frames' is incorrect.This comment applies to .indication primitive as well. | Replace with "The set of elements and fields relevant to PASN authentication from the received Authentication frame from the peer", or something to that effect. The key here is that the parameters that make up the .confirm primitive are derived from the frame received from the peer (and not received from the SME to populate a frame to be sent to the peer). |  |  |

Discussion: This is an issue in the baseline as well. This specific comment addresses a new parameter introduced in .11az.